For a number of years Family Law experts have debated as to whether or not spousal support could be waived in pre-marital agreement and I was of the minority of attorneys who felt it could be.
The majority took the position that for public policy and statutory reasons it could not be waived. In connection with the latter contention the Uniform Pre-Marital Agreement Act permitted the, "modification and elimination of spousal support...." However, the California legislature in 1985 in adopting the act omitted the foregoing section and, therefore, the majority of the attorneys concluded that on the basis of statutory intent, the legislature indicated its view that a pre-marital agreement in California could not deal with the issue of spousal support.
On March 26, 1998 the Court of Appeal in Pendleton v. Fireman (98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 3087) concluded that under the facts before it, two wealthy individuals adequately represented by counsel could in fact waive spousal support and reversed the trial court which held such an agreement in all instances violates California Public Policy.
In so holding, the court reasoned "the public policy considerations of the 19th century have little, if anything, to do with the lives we live on the eve of the 21st century. A system of laws that has abandoned fault-based divorce and unequal control of community property in favor of a statutory scheme imposing mutual and androgynous support obligations should not per se prohibit pre-marital spousal support waivers or limitations."
The court also noted the absence of any binding Supreme Court authority, stating that "[t]he Supreme Court has not addressed the substance of this issue since before the California Act was adopted or at any time since the adoption of no-fault divorce." This, coupled with the legislative purpose behind the California Act of "allowing California case law to continue to prevail on the issue of spousal support in premarital agreements," gave the court "the green light to recognize the simple fact that premarital spousal support waivers and limitations no longer violate public policy."
With that authority, the court found that "[a] rule that does not per se prohibit all spousal waivers or limitations is consistent with other, related laws." For instance, the court notes the ability of "a prospective spouse to make premarital decisions controlling the disposition of the spouse's entire property upon death." In this regard "there is something perverse" about prohibiting premarital decisions controlling support obligations if the marriage ends in divorce.
Finally, the court noted the increasing popularity of premarital agreements and the increasing reasons therefore. "By careful premarital planning and a willingness to mix realism with romance, the bride and groom can protect their existing assets, assume responsibility for their existing debts, characterize after-acquired property, allocate income earned during the marriage, address income tax issues that will arise during marriage and in the event of dissolution or death, and cover general testamentary issues as well as those that may exist if there are children from prior marriages."
Because premarital agreements serve such vast purposes, the court rejected the notion that said agreements promote divorce. Rather "[a]s the law is starting to recognize, premarital agreements may in fact encourage rather than discourage marriage."